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The nexus between relational life and life satisfaction is riddled with endogeneity problems. By 
investigating the causal relationship going from the first to the second variable we consider that 
retirement  is  a  shock  which  increases  the  time  investable  in  (outside  job)  relational  life.  As  a 
consequence  we  instrument  investment  in  relational  goods  with  the  aggregate  exogenous  age-
retirement pattern. With such approach we document that investment in relational life has a positive 
and  significant  effect  on  life  satisfaction.  Consequences  of  our  findings  in  terms  of  retirement 
effects and age-happiness pattern are also discussed. 
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1. Introduction  
Anyone who cannot belong to a community, or has no need to do so in view of his self-sufficiency is 




The number of papers investigating the determinants of life satisfaction published in economic 
journals has been dramatically growing in the last decade (see Clark et al., 2008 and  Frey 2008). 
This is not surprising since well-being has been seen as the ultimate goal of human endeavors in a 
long  tradition  of  thought  from  Aristotle  to  John  Stuart  Mill.  However  only  in  recent  years 
psychologists, economists and others began to show that subjective well-being can be measured 
with reliability and validity, using relatively simple self-rating questions about ‘happiness’ and ‘life 
satisfaction’. Generally speaking, self-ratings of ‘happiness’ turn out to reflect relatively short-term, 
situation-dependent  expressions  of  mood,  whereas  self-ratings  of  ‘life  satisfaction’  appear  to 
                                                 
1 Politics, I, 2, 1253a 28-30.   2
measure  longer-term,  more  stable  evaluations,  but  both  have  been  shown  to  produce  broadly 
consistent findings (see Helliwell 2006 and Krueger 2008).  
A key motivation for the use of subjective well-being data in economics  has been  the desire 
to study the welfare implications of non-traded goods. The Life Satisfaction Approach (Frey et al. 
2004) can in fact be seen as an alternative to the traditional methods of measurement based on 
contingent valuation or revealed preferences 
Subjective assessments of well-being have been used to estimate the shadow value of a wide 
range  of  environmental  and  social  conditions,  such  as  air  quality  and  pollution  Welsch  (2002, 
2006), airport noise (Van Praag and Baarsma 2005), terrorism (Frey et. al. 2007), the fear of crime 
(Moore and Shepherd 2006), marriage (Clark and Oswald 2002; Johnson-Wu, 2002; Blanchflower-
Oswald, 2004; Frey and Stutzer, 2002a, b, 2006) and unemployment (Clark and Oswald, 1994; 
Gallie and Russell, 1998; Di Tella et al., 2001, 2003). 
An  important  class  of  non  traded  goods  is  represented  by  non  instrumental  social 
relationships or ‘relational goods’, as they are often defined in the literature: relational goods are the 
outcome of social activities such as interactions with friends, participation in the life of clubs, 
religious bodies, political parties, unions and civic and cultural organizations etc.  
Many  studies in psychology support the conclusion that social relationships in general, not 
just  marriage,  are  essential  to  well-being:  we  refer  the  interested  reader  to  the  comprehensive 
overview  in  Diener  and  Seligman  (2004).  However  in  standard  economic  models  individuals 
maximize the utility they derive from consumption of market goods and non-work time, while the 
choice between solitary and ‘relational’ leisure is left in the background. As we will see in more 
detail in the next section, both choices are obviously influenced not only by the price system but by 
the social environment and can be affected by a wide range of policies. In particular we shall see 
how due to coordination failure and /or to bounded rationality, consumption of relational goods may 
be inefficiently low at the individual level and even that society as a whole may get stuck in a 
Pareto-dominated equilibrium, which, may be called a ‘social poverty trap’.    3
If economic indicators do not correlate well with the quality of social relationships a key 
contribution to well-being is omitted in standard analyses of policies. The happiness data offer us a 
way to shed light on the monetary cost of such an omission, and thus open a way towards  a better 
evaluation of the equivalent variations of policies. 
The Life Satisfaction Approach  has been used to evaluate social relationships by Helliwell 
and Putnam (2004), Bartolini et al. (2008a and b), Corrado and Aslam  (2007), Becchetti et al. 
(2008), Bruni and Stanca (2008),  Meier and Stutzer (2008),  Powdathvee (2008) among others. All 
these works confirm the findings by psychologists that relational goods are positively associated 
with SWB. However association does not imply causation: an important question still open in this  
literature is whether the direction of causality goes from social relationships to well-being as  the 
idea that high well-being leads to good relationships is also plausible. 
2 
The  problem  of  biunivocal  causality  and  endogeneity  is  pervasive  in  economics  but 
particularly  severe  in  the  field  of  happiness.  Beyond  age  (but  not  longevity!)  almost  all  other 
variables introduced as regressors in life satisfaction equations may both cause and be caused by 
life satisfaction. To provide just an example: the observed positive relationship between marriage 
and life satisfaction may depend on the higher probability for individuals with a happier nature to 
find the right partner. In the same way, the significant relationship between money and happiness 
may also be determined by unobserved individual traits (assertivity, optimism, a well balanced 
personality) which positively affect both subjective well being and professional success. 
A  first  important  opportunity  of    reducing  the  endogeneity  problem  is  offered  by  the 
availability of panel data. We exploit this possibility by conducting our analysis  using the  German 
Socio Economic Panel: (GSOEP) which contains both cross-sectional and longitudinal information 
(from  1984  to  2007)  on  many  variables  (including  self  declared  happiness  and  indicators  of 
relational life) for a large sample of individuals.  
                                                 
2Interestingly  Bartolini  et  al.  (2008)  working  on  US  cross-sectional  data  (US  General  Social  Survey)  find  that 
intrinsically  motivated  group  membership  (‘Putnam  group’  memberships)  is  positively  associated  with  well-being, 
while for membership in ‘Olson’ groups , i.e. instrumentally motivated, the opposite is true.    4
In  fact,  fixed  effect  estimation  makes  it  possible  to  control  for  the  confounding  role  of 
personality differences by which optimists will always say they are happy with their life: in many 
instances a self-fulfilling expectation. In studying personal relationships it is quite obvious that a 
cheerful nature, whether due to genes or to upbringing, will make one’s social life easier and more 
rewarding: it is therefore doubly important in this case to control for permanent psychological traits 
by using panel data: Becchetti et. al (2008) and Powdatvee (2008), show that the link between 
happiness and social life survives to the elimination of this fixed component by using respectively 
German and British panel data.  
However even when using panel data techniques the problem remains that time variations in 
SWB for the same individual may affect potential happiness determinants.  
This time varying dimension of the endogeneity problem is particularly severe when we 
consider the relational goods - well being nexus. Just by introspection, it is quite obvious to us that 
not only our personality, but also our mood and transient feelings affect our propensity to meet 
people and participate in social events. 
To deal with this form of reverse causality, which cannot be taken care of by fixed effects 
estimation, we have to find a proper instrument, i.e. a variable which is exogenous at the individual 
level but that is correlated with the endogenous regressor, in the absence of natural experiments.
3  
Our  instrumentation  strategy  hinges  on  retirement.  Retirement  may  be  conceived  as  a 
permanent change in the individual organization of time which leads to a deep rescheduling of 
one’s own agenda, i.e. a dramatic fall in hours worked (not necessarily leading to zero worked 
hours since many retired individuals keep some informal working activities also after retiring) and a 
corresponding large increase in leisure, i.e. in time potentially investable in relational and social 
activities.  However,  even  if  it  possesses  important  properties  for  the  solution  of  the  problem, 
retirement cannot instrument as such the relational goods indicator we use because the timing of 
retirement  may be partially a choice influenced by one’s wellbeing. Retirement age is often fixed 
                                                 
3 Meier and Stutzer (2008), who concentrate on volunteering, tackle the causality problem by using the collapse of the 
East Germany volunteering infrastructure.   5
by law but several flexibility clauses generally exist. In Germany the mandatory age is 65 but the 
law creates a wide window of opportunities for retirement decisions around the official retirement 
date.  
We therefore need a factor, correlated with the individual retirement decision and with the 
increase in time investable in relational goods, which cannot be suspected of being a choice variable 
at  the  individual  level.  We  find  such  variable  in  an  age-retirement  function  which  maps  each 
individual-age observation in the sample into the share of the retired population for that age.
4 This 
function may be regarded as the probability of being retired at a certain age based on the sample 
distribution of retirement decisions. This  variable is then used as an instrument for a relational-life-
investment indicator.  
Summing up, we create value added in the happiness literature by improved identification of 
the causal effect of relational goods on life satisfaction.  
Our results emphasize that relational consequences of economic policies need to be carefully 
taken into account when pursuing the goal of maximising social welfare. The advice stemming from 
our paper is that measures aimed at stimulating social life and at preventing negative side-effects of 
policies are of crucial importance.  
The paper is divided into five sections (including introduction and conclusions). The second 
section outlines the concept of relational goods and the related theoretical literature. The third and 
the  fourth  present  and  comment  our  descriptive  and  econometric  findings.  The  fifth  section 
concludes. 
 
2. Relational goods: an overview of theoretical background  
 
                                                 
4 It would be possible to use the age-retirement pattern of the entire German population. Given the large size of our 
sample we argue that the sample age-retirement pattern conveniently approximates that of the entire population and 
retains as well the characteristics of not being influenced by the observed individual retirement decision. To be more 
precise, strictly speaking, the individual retirement observation obviously contribute to the sample average but, given 
the large number of observations, its contribution is negligible.   6
Relational goods are a set of intangibles from companionship, sympathy and  intimacy, to feeling 
part of a community with same values or tastes etc. Bardsley and Sugden (2006) borrows from 
Adam Smith’s Theory of Moral Sentiments the term ‘fellow-feelings’, to describe the mental states 
produced during such non instrumental social interactions. The production process of these goods is 
the meeting- ‘encounter’ in Gui 2005’s definition- with family and friends.or with a wider net of 
partners, i.e. many kinds of social events (association gatherings, cultural or sport events, etc.). 
Participating in a political debate, volunteering, applauding at a theatre are encounter examples of 
relational goods produced on this larger scale. 
According to Gui (1987) and (2005) and Ulhaner (1989) relational goods are a specific kind 
of local public goods. They are local public goods because an agent’s consumption of those goods 
increases with the amount of time the agent devotes to socializing as well as with the socializing 
effort  expended  by  other  agents.  Indeed,  the  fact  that,  by  definition,  relational  goods  can  only 
jointly and simultaneously be produced and consumed makes them better defined as anti-rival than 
as  simply  non  rival.  Another  defining  feature  of  relational  goods  is  that  their  value  crucially 
depends on the sincerity and genuineness of the people involved. This implies that they can be 
generated as a by product of some instrumental activity but not exchanged through the market or 
indeed produced by state, which of course means they don’t have a price and that their value has 
instead to be estimated. Nor can the estimation be done just by looking at their opportunity cost in 
terms of labour income given up by choosing leisure. Indeed leisure includes many heterogeneous 
activities which can be relational, pseudo-relational (second life in internet) or utterly non relational 
(hours spent alone on TV). Interestingly, life satisfaction has been found to be negatively correlated 
with TV viewing,  directly in Frey et. al. (2007) and indirectly by  reducing time spent in relational 
activities in Bruni and Stanca (2008). Frey et al. (2007) find this evidence difficult to reconcile  
with the theory of revealed preference, by which any observed choice is utility maximizing, and 
interpret the finding as suggesting that people do not always act rationally, but often just follow 
habits and impulses. Indeed Frey et al. (2006) argue that individuals are prone to mispredict utility,   7
through underestimation of adaptation, distorted memories of past experiences, materialistic beliefs 
fostered by institutions (e.g. marketing) and that these cognitive limits leads to overconsume goods 
satisfying  extrinsic  needs  (material  goods  beside  basic  necessities)  and  underconsume  goods 
satisfying  intrinsic  needs,  relational  goods  among  them.  Empirical  evidence  on  this  distorted 
choices is offered by these authors by studying commuting. On the other hand, evidence on the 
association between well-being and generosity (measured in experiments)  is found in  Konow and 
Earley (2008). 
A different explanation, by no means alternative to the ‘behavioral’ one put forward by Frey 
et al.(2007) for the opposite signs of the correlation of happiness with solo and social leisure-time  
brings us back to the local public goods characteristic of relational goods, which means they are not 
an  option  freely  available  at  the  individual  level.  An  individual’s  time  use  choices  may  be 
contingent on the time use choices of others, because the utility derived from leisure time often 
benefits from the presence of companionable others. Corneo (2005) and Jenkins and Osberg (2003) 
Antoci at al. (2005), Bruni et. Al. (2008) develop models starting from the this premise that one 
cannot have a social life unilaterally. Various types of external effects concerning relational goods 
can be distinguished: there is an externality in the formation of an agent’s social network as the 
probability of a successful match with a partner increases with the time the agent  and the potential 
partners  devote  to  searching.  Merz  and  Osberg  (2006)  find  that the  proportion  of  leisure  time 
devoted to social leisure is higher in Lander with more public holidays. A second type of externality 
concerns the efforts by the agent and the potential partners in cultivating their skills as partners. 
There are externalities at the aggregate level: it is easier and more rewarding to participate in an 
association  in  a  social  context  characterized  by  a  rich  network  of  associative  opportunities. 
Likewise, high social participation may lead to the formation of new associations, while continuing 
to feed the existing ones.   8
Due to these multi-level net of externalities equilibria with low socializing may coexist with 
equilibria with high socializing for groups of individuals as well as for nations as a whole.
5  
The consumption of relational goods will affect labour supply decisions: when other persons 
increase their hours of paid work, the probability of a feasible and desirable leisure match falls, 
which  decreases  the  personal  utility  of  non-work  time.  The  consequences  of  such  strategic 
complementarities  in the enjoyment of leisure are considered in Alesina et. al. (2005) and Burda et 
al. (2008) in analyzing the difference in hours worked between Europe and the US, which has 
emerged in the 1970’s and has been increasing since then. This difference might not be due to a 
difference  in  the  tax  system,  as  maintained  by  Prescott  (2004)  or  in  tastes  as  suggested  by 
Blanchard (2006) instead history (e.g., the first oil shock) and institutions (labor-market regulations) 
might have simply led otherwise identical Americans and Europeans to coordinate on different 
equilibria.
6 In the “US” equilibrium, individuals work a lot, consume a lot, and have little time for 
communal activities. In the “European” equilibrium, consumers work less and consume less, but 
enjoy more common leisure. The European equilibrium Pareto dominates the US outcome in which 
individuals  “bowl alone,” as deplored by Putnam (2000).  
Indeed Alesina et al. (2005) find that happiness is higher in countries with lower working 
hours. We can add that for the European countries there is a upward-sloping trend in happiness and 
a downward sloping trend in hours worked while for the US there is no trend in happiness and a 
upward sloping trend in hours worked as shown by Wolfers and Stevenson (2008) . 
Finally the theme of relational goods is at least implicitly present in the vast literature on 
social capital, which studies its positive impact on the productivity of traditional private goods.  
                                                 
5 Antoci et. al(2007) show how bounded individual rationality and externalities combine in producing ‘social poverty’ 
traps.  
  
6 According to these authors one of the strongest pieces of evidence in favor of complementarities across either leisure 
or work is that an overwhelming share of the population both in Europe and the US takes its two days of leisure during 
Saturday and Sunday. There would be huge benefits from staggering work so that different people take different days 
off during the week: this could reduce commuting time and  would allow capital to be spread over more workers: the 
fact that this is not done suggest that the costs in terms of forgone welfare due to less coordinated leisure would be 
sizable as well.   9
Higher  social  participation  may  bring  about  social  capital  accumulation  as  a  by-product.  For 
instance, trust (or empathy) may be reinforced and generalised through social interactions.
7  
This  implies  that  disregard  for  effects  of  economic  policies  on  relational  goods  may 
negatively  affect  not  only  individual  life  satisfaction  but  also  the  prerequisites  which  make 
economic prosperity possible.  
This rhapsodic overview of the recent economic literature on relational goods  is far from 
complete. However we hope it is enough to convince the reader that the empirical study of the 
hypothesis that less social leisure leads to lower lifetime utility, on which we report in the following 
sections,  has vast implications for the study of  contemporary society. 
 
3. Descriptive empirical findings 
 
The obvious problem in identifying a positive relationship from relational goods to life satisfaction 
is that the hypothesis of a reverse causality link is equally convincing. If it is reasonable to assume 
that the quality of relational life has a favourable impact on happiness, it is all the more so that 
happier individuals are highly likely to be more willing, or in the right mood, to cultivate their 
relational life. To solve the puzzle we should identify factors which determine an exogenous shock 
in time invested in relational goods in personal life. We find one of these factors in an event which 
occurs in every worker’s life: retirement. What we illustrate in this first descriptive analysis is that: 
i) retirement (voluntary or involuntary) events are concentrated in the early 60es; ii) retirement 
causes a sharp reduction (increase) in working (leisure) time; iii) a significant increase in time 
invested in relational life occurs in the early 60es; iv) in the same period we observe a rise in life 
and, even more, in leisure satisfaction.  
We perform our empirical analysis on the GSOEP
8 using waves from 1984 to 2007.  
                                                 
7 We notice however that the econometric techniques we use are unable to capture these more universal benefits of 
relational goods.    10
If we look at the share of retired individuals by age in our GSOEP sample we find a sharp 
jump at 60 (from 30 to 50 percent) and at 65 (from 80 to 93) (Figure 1). As a consequence, the 
largest part of individuals in our sample retire between 60 and 65. If we restrict the analysis to the  
subset  of  individuals  getting  retired  during  the  survey  (4,580  observations)  and  look  at  the 
cumulative density function, we observe that 50 percent of the sample gets retired before 60, while 
45 percent of the sample gets retired between 60 and 63 (Figure 2).  
It is therefore not strange that, in the same age cohorts, we observe a sharp change in daily 
worked hours during the working week (the average difference is 4.3 hours between 50 and 52, 4.9 
between 56 and 58, while dropping to 2.4 between 65 and 67) (Figure 3). Note that, even though the 
difference between retired and non retired individuals in these cohorts is sharp, we also observe a 
clear decline in worked hours of non retired individuals in the same age intervals. A similar drop is 
observed on hours worked on Saturdays and Sundays.  
To verify the correspondence between retirement age and time invested in relational life we build a 
“relational time index” (RTI) using information gathered in the GSOEP on time dedicated to the 
production of relational goods. In five questions, individuals are asked about the intensity with 
which they: i) “attend social gatherings”; ii) “attend cultural events”; iii) “participate in sports”; 
iv) “perform volunteer work”; v) “attend church or religious events”. We reclassify answers on 
these points in a variable which can take values from 3 to 0, depending on how much time is 
devoted  to  each  particular  relational  activity  (0=Never,  1=Less  Frequently,  2=Every  Month, 
3=Every Week).
9 
                                                                                                                                                                  
8 The GSOEP is a longitudinal household survey sponsored by the Deutsche Forschungsgemeinschaft and organized by 
the  German  Institute  for  Economic  Research  (Berlin), and  the  Center  for  Demography  and  Economics  of  Aging 
(Syracuse University). It has the advantage of being one of the very few longitudinal sources (together with BHPS) 
containing information on life satisfaction for a long number of years for the same individual. We are grateful to these 
institutes and the project director Dr. G. Wagner for making this dataset available. 
9 We use this scale since survey answers do not allow us to infer exactly a per month or per week frequency in presence 
of the “less frequently” response. Given the more than proportional increase in intensity between “each month” and 
“each week” our unweighted average flattens high intensity responses and may be conceived as a sort of log transform 
of the true unobserved frequency of relational activity. A robustness check in which we impute the presumed actual (per 
month) frequencies on the basis of qualitative responses (and, more specifically, one every two months to the “less 
frequently  answer)  has  been  performed.  Results  are  substantially  unchanged  and  available  from  the  authors  upon 
request.    11
All the above mentioned activities produce relational goods in the way we defined them in 
the previous section. Social gatherings generate local public goods of the kind described by Gui 
(1989). Indeed, any individual who decides to participate to them, creates a positive externality for 
other participants: being in larger numbers reinforces the emotional effect of the common consent, 
it provides positive feedback to the decision to participate to the gatherings and increases their 
enjoyment. Cultural events display similar characteristics even though the “production” activity on 
behalf  of  participants  is  much  weaker  (the  event  is  produced  anyway,  even  with  very  few 
participants, but high participation increases the value of the good and some of its peculiar aspects, 
for  instance  an  applause  or  a  laughter  in  a  theatre).  Participants  to  sport  events  produce  and 
consume relational goods stimulated by the fact of sharing the same emotions when supporting the 
same team or champion. The interpersonal dimension is essential in church or religious events 
which are partially produced and consumed by community members and stimulate those “fellow 
feelings” which, according to Adam Smith (1759), strengthen ties among participants.
10 Finally, 
voluntary work is, in general, jointly performed by individuals with similar intrinsic motivations. 
The gratuitous and gift-giving nature of this activity has also the effect of reinforcing ties not only 
among volunteers but also between the volunteers and the beneficiaries of their unpaid job. The 
“fellow feeling” argument therefore applies also here. 
Using  these  five  different  indicators,  and  following  Becchetti  et  al.  (2008),  we  build  a 
“Relational Time Index” (from now on RTI) as an unweighted average of the points given to the 
five questions by each respondent. Our choice is motivated by two main reasons. 
First, we are interested in a synthetic indicator on the relational investment by individuals 
which  goes  beyond  the  information  provided  by  a  single  component.  Second,  this  synthetic 
indicator allows us to reduce the problem of missing data since none of the five variables above is 
surveyed along the 24 waves. In order to have a higher number of observations and cover more 
                                                 
10  Adam  Smith  arguably  notes  that  “fellow  feelings”  (common  consent)  may  be  equally  fuelled  by  pleasant  and 
unpleasant joint experiences and that emotionally unpleasant joint experiences (i.e. attending a funeral of a beloved 
person with other friends) have a strong impact on the formation of a common consent among people.   12
years  we  calculate  the  RTI  index  on  the  basis  of  non  missing  relational  variables  for  each 
individual-year.  
By looking at the RTI indicator and at its individual components we find that the time spent 
in relational activities becomes significantly higher during the retirement period after controlling for 
socio demographic variables (employment status, marital status, health) and time dummies in a 
fixed effect panel estimate. The result holds when we plot estimated age effects on attending sport 
events, time spent with friends in religious circles, in volunteering activities, in attending cultural 
events and social gatherings (Figure 4). 
From this first inspection of data it is evident that retirement is a shock on the organisation 
of time which determines a sharp rise in leisure and in time investable in relational goods. 
Since  most  compulsory  or  voluntary  retirement  decisions  occur  in  the  early  sixties,  we 
inspect the age-happiness pattern and find that the increase in life and leisure satisfaction is well 
visible in the first part of the 60es. Average life satisfaction levels for a given age exhibit the well 
known U-shaped relationship: at 29 average life satisfaction is 7.13, it falls to a minimum of 6.76 at 
55, and rises up to 7.07 for the 65 years old respondents (see Figure 5). The difference between the 
three levels is significant at 95 percent level. The U-shape in life satisfaction is paralleled by a 
similar,  but  more  pronounced,  U-shape  in  leisure  satisfaction  (see  Figure  6).  Average  leisure 
satisfaction is 6.42 at 29 years, drops to a minimum (6.24) at 34  and rises up to 8.05 at 67. What is 
impressive is the dramatic jump in the indicator between 59 and 63. During this period average 
leisure satisfaction is significantly higher at 95 percent each year vis-à-vis the previous one. 
Descriptive findings therefore highlight a sharp change in the work/leisure ratio between late 
50es and early 60es or around a threshold which roughly corresponds to the retirement event. In 
parallel, we find a significant rise in life and a more pronounced rise in leisure satisfaction. The 
observed changes may definitely help us to build the instrument necessary to test the effect of 
relational goods on happiness. 
   13
4. Econometric findings 
 
Based on descriptive findings we intend to test the relational good-happiness nexus through the 
following steps: i) a base specification including fixed effects, time dummies and age categories 
built in a way which avoids serious multicollinearity problems; ii) the inclusion of a relational 
investment index in the base specification; iii) an IV estimate in which the relational investment 
index is instrumented by an exogenous aggregate age-retirement pattern; iv) robustness checks with 
various subsamples and with modified models which combine in different ways fixed effects, time 
dummies and age effects; v) tests on survivorship and entry bias; vi) an alternative test of the 
hypothesis with a fuzzy discontinuity design in an ordered probit model with Mundlak corrected 
random effects. 
 
We start from a standard specification which includes as regressors marital and employment 
status,  gender,  education,  health  status,  number  of  children,  log  of  equivalised  real  household 
income  per  capita,  East/West  dummy,  house  ownership.  Following  a  standard  approach  in  the 
literature we also add changes in employment and marital status.
11 
In  order  to  minimise  the  omitted  variable  bias  we  choose  a  benchmark  model  which 
incorporates fixed effects, time dummies capturing socioeconomic countrywide shocks and age 
categories, avoiding to impose too restrictive functional forms on the age effect. Opinions on the 
inclusion of year dummies in these types of estimates are mixed. On the one side, it is observed that 
the latter capture aggregate year shocks (macroeconomic performance, legal or regulatory changes) 
so that their missed consideration would cause serious omitted variable bias. On the other side, it is 
observed that, even when not using the linear age variable, the three (age, time and fixed) effects 
                                                 
11 Differently from two previous studies which investigate the age-happiness relationship on the same data (Frijters and 
Beaton, 2008; Van Landeghem, 2008), we do not restrict the analysis to West Germans (as in Frijters et al., 2008) and 
do not work only on the balanced panel (as in Van Landeghem, 2008). This is because, on our opinion, the balanced 
panel sacrifices an incredible amount of precious information and, while eliminating the entry bias, it worsens the 
survivorship bias. Our main results are however supported also in these two specific subsamples. Results are omitted for 
reasons of space and available upon request.   14
could create collinearity. To overcome the problem in our estimates, we progressively eliminate 
time dummies which determine the stronger reduction of the variance inflation factor (VIF),
12 until 
we reach the acceptable threshold of 5.  
In the first four columns of Table 1 we present the following specifications: i) the base 
equation; ii) the base equation plus the retirement variable; iii) the base equation plus the RTI 
variable; iv) a base equation plus the retirement and RTI variables. Since the RTI variable is present 
only  in  a  limited  number  of  waves  the  number  of  observations  in  columns  3  and  4  falls 
considerably.
13  
Empirical  findings  confirm  the  “almost  stylised  facts”  of  the  happiness  literature.  The 
positive and significant effect of household income, marriage status and the negative and significant 
effect of separation, unemployment and health status (Table 1, column 1).  
A distinctive element with respect to most papers in the literature is our use of equivalised 
household income computed following the OECD equivalence scale,
14 together with the number of 
children  variable.  This  makes  the  children  variable  positive  and  significant.  In  this  way  we 
disentangle two children effects: a negative one represented by the reduction of per capita income 
within the household and a positive one represented by the value of having them. 
The selection process to avoid multicollinearity leads us to drop a few time dummies. We 
omit for reasons of space results for the remaining year dummies with the exception of the post 
reunification  year  1992  which  has  the  highest  positive  and  significant  coefficient  among  year 
effects.  
                                                 
12 The VIF (variance inflation factor) formula is 1/1-R(x) where R(x) is the R squared when the independent variable is        
regressed on all other independent variables (Marquardt, 1970). If R(x) is low (tends to zero) the VIF test is low (equal 
to one). A VIF value below 10 (or, more restrictively, five) is considered acceptable by rules of thumb standardly 
adopted  in the literature. 
13 The base equation (Table 1, column 1) with a limited number of observations coinciding with those of the RTI 
augmented estimate does not change significantly our findings. It is omitted for reasons of space and available upon 
request. 
14 Equivalised income is household income which is adjusted by using an equivalence scale to take into account the size 
and composition of the household. Here we used the “OECD equivalence scale”. This assigns a value of 1 to the first 
household member, of 0.7 to each additional adult and of 0.5 to each child. This scale (also called “Oxford scale”) was 
mentioned by OECD (1982) for possible use in “countries which have not established their own equivalence scale”. For 
this reason, this scale is sometimes labelled “(old) OECD scale”.   15
Both  the  retirement  and  the  relational  good  variables  are  positive  and  significant  when 
separately considered and when jointly introduced in the estimates (Table 1, columns 2-4). The 
rationale for the retirement effect is twofold. On the one side, people may enjoy retirement in 
proportion of their previous job dissatisfaction. In parallel to this, what may occur in the 50/60 
turnaround is the reorganisation of time (retired individuals are back in control of their agenda) and 
the increased investment in relational goods due to the work/leisure change. The age categories and 
the RTI variable may capture this last effect, while the retirement variable the first one. 
The puzzle is that, the significance of the age cohorts from 59 to 61 and over does not 
disappear even when we include the RTI and retirement variables. Therefore, the life satisfaction 
revolution at 60s may not be interpreted as solely determined by the retirement shock. There are 
two plausible arguments reconciling such findings with the hypothesis of retirement-relational good 
nexus: i) if hours worked are reduced in this age category even for those who are not retired (as it is 
evident from Figure 3), we may think that the disutility of work is reduced also for them; ii) if the 
consumption of relational goods increases even for non-retired, one could argue that, since the peers 
of non retired are retired, it is easier for this group of people to avoid the relational poverty trap. 
Individuals work more than socially optimal because of status race and consumption of positional 
goods, but when their reference group starts to retire they also are better off whether or not they  
retire. 
 
4.1 Tackling the endogeneity problem: the IV estimates  
 
In the first four estimates we observed that the relational time indicator effect on life satisfaction is 
positive, significant and robust (Table 1, columns 1-4). We however clarified in the introduction 
that the problem of endogeneity related to this variable is serious and cannot be solved uniquely by 
controlling for fixed effects.    16
Descriptive  evidence  documented  that  retirement  generates  a  significant  shock  on  time 
investable in (outside the job) relational goods (Figure 4). Since retirement is however partially 
endogenous we use as a proxy for the retirement shock: the retirement-age pattern of the sample. 
This variable may be read as the probability that an individual of a given age is retired (or that his 
close peers are retired) and therefore that she may benefit from the additional time investable in 
relational goods. The variable cannot definitely be suspected of reverse causality since it cannot be 
significantly affected by the happiness of the observed individual. This leads us to use it as an 
instrument for the relational time index in a standard panel IV estimate.  
When estimating the model with this approach, we find that the relational time index is 
significant, irrespective of the introduction or not of the retirement variable (Table 1, columns 5-6). 
As it is well known the quality of an instrument and its exogeneity is a statistical matter. To this 
purpose,  we  use  the  standard  approach  of  verifying  whether  the  residual  -  from  a  “modified 
specification” in which instruments replace selected endogenous regressors -  has significant effects 
when introduced in the standard non instrumented equation. As it is well known, instruments are 
exogenous if the null of the insignificance of the added variable (the residual from the “modified 
specification”) in the standard non instrumented equation is not rejected. To see whether this is true 
or  not,  we  compute  the  Davidson-McKinnon  (1993)  test  on  exogeneity  in  panel  data  with 
instrumental  variables  and  find  that  the  null  of  non  endogeneity  is  not  rejected.  Note  that  the 
significance of the 59-61 up to 55-57 age categories disappears (and no other age categories are 
significant) in the IV estimates, a finding which is not at odd with the hypothesis that the bump of 
the age-happiness during the early 60es may be determined by the retirement-relational good shock. 
 
4.2 Robustness in subsample splits  
 
Table 2 shows that our finding  works separately in different subsamples. The retirement effect on 
life satisfaction is almost three times larger for males than for females, while the enjoyment of   17
relational life is similar for the two sexes. This may be interpreted in the sense that job-induced 
relational loss is much stronger for males who use to work more hours and have a higher share of 
full time jobs.  Being retired is significant for both employed and disabled workers.
15  
The RTI variable is always significant in the observed subsamples even when we introduce the 
retirement variable. When we instrument it with the age-retirement pattern, it remains significant in 
the male, employed and occupationally disabled subsamples.  
 
4.3 Robustness in estimation methods  
 
In  this  section  we  want  to  check  whether  the  effect  of  relational  goods  on  happiness  remains 
significant in relevant subsamples whenever we modify the choice on how to include age, time and 
individual fixed effects. As described above (see section 4), the benchmark model is estimated with 
a panel fixed effect regression including time dummies and age categories. Analysing here the 
possible alternative specifications with their drawbacks and advantages, allows us to better justify 
our estimation choice.  
The first choice made was on age specification: nearly all recent papers assume a U-shape 
relation between happiness and age. Frijters and al. (2008) show that in most of these studies the 
effect of linear age is always negative, whilst that of age-squared is positive, indicating a U-shape. 
Although this seems to be a typical finding in happiness regressions, we prefer not to impose a rigid 
functional form to age. Following Clark (2006) and Van Landeghem (2008), we use dummies 
representing age-bounded categories. Age categories comprise 3 years: 17-19, 20-22 . . . 77-79, and 
                                                 
15 Besides old age pensions the German welfare system provides disability benefits to workers of all ages not able to 
carry on a regular employment.  If this inability is complete they receive full old age benefits, the so called disability 
pension (“Erwerbsunfähigkeitsrente”, EU). A person that can work only half of the time or less compared to a healthy 
person received two-thirds of old age benefits (“Berufsunfähigkeitsrente”, BU). In the 1970s and early 1980s, the 
German jurisdiction has interpreted the rules on disability very broadly, in particular the applicability of the first rule. 
Disability is the most important pathway to retirement for civil servants: 47% of those who retired in the year 1999 used 
disability retirement. Hence we may consider the disabled group as a hybrid set (of not fully (irregularly) employed 
partially subsidized workers) which stands between full employment and straight unemployment.    18
the omitted category is the age group containing individuals in their eighties. Another issue is 
whether to estimate a pooled cross-sectional or a fixed effects regression.  
In Table 3.a we present the pooled regression model where we compare two possible age 
specifications: the quadratic functional form and the dummy categories. The relational time index is 
strongly significant and positive over all subsamples and it maintains almost the same coefficient 
regardless the age specification, even when we introduce the retirement variable. On the contrary, 
the retirement variable behaves differently when age is expressed in the quadratic form (positive 
impact) or when we use categories (negative impact). The possible omitted variable bias due to the 
exclusion of fixed effects leads us to prefer the panel analysis. 
In Table 3.b we estimate our model using fixed individual effects. We did not include time 
dummies because of the perfect multicollinearity that relates them to age in its quadratic form. The 
RTI variable maintains a strongly significant effect on life satisfaction. Taking into account the 
individual personal traits allows us to observe a positive effect of retirement on life satisfaction. All 
other regressors, here omitted for reasons of space, maintain the same sign and effect as the one 
expected in the literature. However, both these models suffer from a possible omitted variable bias 
due to the exclusion of time dummies.  
 
4.5 Survivorship and entry bias  
 
In our analysis we use the entire SOEP dataset, including all the subsamples from A through H
16, 
waves 1 to 24. The dataset evolves over time because of new subsamples being introduced. In each 
subsample, new entrants are limited to households split (i.e., individuals who move out and form 
their  own  households),  and  to  individuals  who  moved  into  an  original  household  because  of 
marriage or to new “born sample member”. On the other side, households may leave the survey for 
                                                 
16 Subsample A: Individuals and Household Residents in West Germany (1984 – 2007), Subsample B: Foreigners in 
West Germany (1984 – 2007), Subsample C: Residents in East Germany (1990 – 2007), Subsample D: Immigrants 
(1995 – 2007), Subsample E: Refreshment (1998 – 2007), Subsample F: Innovation (2000 – 2007), Subsample G: 
Oversampling of High Income (2002 – 2007), Subsample H: Refreshment (2006 – 2007).   19
several reasons. If the panel attrition due to respondents moving abroad or dying can be ignored, the 
one due to survey related reasons is an issue. Kron and Spieß (2008) provide evidence on the risk of 
survey-related panel attrition in different groups of the original sample units (e.g., in different sub-
samples, age, educational, and income groups). 
Observing both the entire GSOEP and the single subsamples, the share of non responses is 
very high. Attrition in the panel generates two potential problems which undermine our estimation 
of life satisfaction: survivorship bias and entry bias. For survivorship bias we mean the possibility 
that our findings could be the spurious result of a selection process by which the characteristics of 
those who survive in the questionnaire are heterogeneous with respect to those of exitors. If happier 
individuals have a higher probability of surviving across waves, the survivorship bias could be the 
driving force behind the relational good effect instrumented by the age-retirement pattern. In such 
case we should observe a spurious effect on the increased happiness of the elders. Note, however, 
that the early 60es bump and the decreasing part of the happiness-age relationship after 75 would be 
difficult to reconcile with the idea of happier survivors unless we are in presence of an abnormally 
high rate of exits at the 50/60 turnaround and a subsequent fall after 75.  
For entry bias affecting our results, we refer to the assumption of Frijters et al. (2008). They 
argue that individuals entering the survey declare very high life satisfaction values while, gradually 
over time, their responses tend to be more sincere and their life satisfaction evaluation tends to go 
down. In this case a significantly larger share of entries of over-60 individuals could be a spurious 
explanation of our findings. 
Based on the description of these two biases we preliminarily check whether we have an 
abnormal exit rate around the 50/60 turnaround. The data clearly show that this is not the case. On 
average exits amount to 2.2 percent of our observations and there is no significant change in the 
early sixties. In the same way we do not observe an abnormal share of entries concentrated in the 
same age cohort.   20
We further test for the existence of survivorship bias. As suggested by Wooldridge (2002), 
we estimate the determinants of exit with a probit regression. The exit dummy for the response to 
our dependent variable (life satisfaction) is regressed on the usual socio demographic controls, age 
categories and time dummies. We also introduce time invariant effects: following Mundlak (1978), 
we create time averages of all the socio demographic explanatory variables. In the second stage, we 
introduce in the baseline equation the predicted value of the probit equation. Given the lack of 
significance of the introduced variable, we can state that our results are not affected by survivorship 
bias. The same procedure applies to verify for the presence of entry bias on our dependent variable. 
In our base regression the predicted entry probability does not significantly differ from zero.   
 
4.6 Fuzzy discontinuity design with random effect ordered probit 
 
An important limit to our previous findings is the approximation of the categorical life satisfaction 
variable to a continuous one. Even though this is common in the happiness literature, we want to 
verify  whether  our  results  on  relational  life  are  confirmed  when  accounting  for  the  discrete 
qualitative nature of our dependent variable.  
To  do  so  we  combine  a  random  effect  ordered  probit  estimate
17  with  an  alternative 
methodology for tackling endogeneity: the fuzzy discontinuity approach.  
As  it  is  well  known  it  is  possible  to  implement  a  discontinuity  design
18  when  the 
beneficiaries/non-beneficiaries of a treatment can be ordered along a quantifiable dimension and the 
latter  can  be  used  to  compute  a  well-defined  index or parameter. The crucial point is that the 
                                                 
17 One problem of the random effect approach is the restrictive assumption of an individual random effect uncorrelated 
with the explanatory variables. In order to deal with the endogeneity problem, we follow the Mundlak (1978) approach. 
We  incorporate  as  correction  factors  individual  intertemporal  means  of  the  socio  demographic  regressors.  Their 
coefficients capture the correlation with the individual effects of persistent personality traits and are assumed to be 
constant across time.  
18 For a theoretical treatment see van der Klaauw et al. (2001). For other prominent examples of this approach, see, 
among others, Angrist and Levy (1999), van der Klaauw (2002), Jacob and Lefgren (2004), or Ludwig and Miller 
(2007).   21
index/parameter must have a cut-off point for eligibility and must be what decides the assignment 
of a potential beneficiary to the treatment (or to non-treatment). 
The main intuition of this approach is that, around the cut-off point, treatment and control 
sample individuals must be very similar to each other. Discontinuity designs may be sharp or fuzzy. 
They are sharp when a unique cut off univocally divides treatment from control sample. They are 
fuzzy when the discontinuity may be correlated with the treatment and the cut off is not univocal. 
More formally, if retirement was entirely exogenous and fixed at 60 for all individuals, we could 
use the following standard specification for a sharp discontinuity design 
0 *1( , Re ) it l l j j k k i it
l j k
LS Dtime Agecat Controls T Age tage u                                    
where Retage is aN age threshold common to every individuals (i.e. 60). In this case, the test on the 
significance of the treatment would be based on the significance of the   coefficient. 
Since large part of retirement decisions are agglomerated around 60-63 years, the age of 
retirement is partly endogenous and it may be, in turn, correlated with its effects on happiness. We 
therefore device a “fuzzy” discontinuity design in which we instrument the treatment with the age-
retirement function f(RA). The function takes the value of the share of retired individuals for each 
individual age observation. It cannot be affected by a single individual and has the advantage of 
being uncorrelated with age dummies. As a consequence we estimate  
0 [ ( )] it l l j j k k i it
l j k
LS Dtime Agecat Controls f RA u                                 
where f(RA) is the retirement age function. To avoid that the function captures also the retirement 
effects  not  related  to  the  relational  good  effects,  we  add  the  retirement  dummy  among  the 
regressors. 
The  estimates  presented  in  Table  4  show  that  the     coefficient  for  the  retirement  age 
function  is  strongly  significant  both  in  the  overall  sample  and  in  the  restricted  subsample  that 
includes individuals in a limited interval around the 60 threshold (those aged from 50 to 70).  
   22
5. Conclusions 
 
Common sense tells us that relational life should play an important role in life satisfaction. As 
human beings we are both individua substantia rationalis (in the  Boetius acception) but also “knots 
of  relationships”,  dramatically  influenced  by  our  recognition,  appreciation  and  acceptance  by 
others.  
With the Meier and Stutzer (2008) exception, the few empirical contributions investigating 
the relational good-happiness nexus have not solved the endogeneity problem. If the links between 
almost  all  potential  determinants  and  life  satisfaction  tend  to  be  endogenous  and  suffer  from 
biunivocal causation, this is all the more true for investment in relational goods.  
In this paper we devise an original approach to tackle the endogeneity issue. We consider 
that the retirement event allows individuals to re-master their own agenda and to invest the hours 
worked before retiring in time dedicated to social and relational activities. Since retirement is a 
partially endogenous phenomenon, we observe the age pattern behind retirement decisions and use 
it to create an exogenous instrument. Our findings document that relational goods have a significant 
effect on life satisfaction which is quite robust under different models and specifications. 
Our paper may also be read as providing a rationale and an explanation to part of the age-
happiness mystery. In fact, we show that behind the quadratic approximation, which captures the 
well known U-shaped relationship between age and happiness, the rising part of such relationship 
may be explained by the retirement/relational good effect. An indirect proof of that is given by the 
fact that when we restrict our sample to unemployed individuals or when we instrument with the 
exogenous retirement age pattern our relational good index, we do not observe the strong effect of 
the sixties on happiness. 
Our  findings  document  that  the  impact  on  the  quality  of  relational  goods  is  one  of  the 
important  indirect  and  unintended  consequences  which  need  to  be  cautiously  evaluated  when 
formulating  economic  policies.  Economic  models  based  on  standard  utility  functions  tend   23
structurally to neglect this aspect since relational arguments do not appear in agents’ satisfaction. 
Our findings suggest that this omission is important, not only for its consequences on trust and 
creation  of  economic  value,  but  also  on  individual  life  satisfaction.  Care  for  policy  measures’ 
collateral effects on relational life may help to strengthen mechanisms for the creation of economic 















   24
 
Figure 1. Share of the retired population by age in the 
GSOEP 24 wave sample 
 
Figure 2. Cumulative distribution function of 





Figure 3. Daily average worked hours for retired and non retired individuals in different age categories  
(working week, Saturdays and Sundays) 
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Figure 4. Predicted age effects on time spent in relational life events such as Social Gathering, Volunteering, 
Sport, Cultural events, Religion, after controlling for socio demographic variables (employment status, marital 
status, health) and time dummies in a fixed effect panel estimate. Range of variation on the vertical axis: 
(0=Never, 1=Less Frequently, 2=Every Month and 3=Every Week) 
 
 
Figure 5. Average Life Satisfaction levels by Age  
 
 
Figure 6. Average Leisure Satisfaction levels by Age  
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Table 1. The effect of relational goods on Life Satisfaction: GSOEP, 1984 – 2007 (fixed effects regression) 
Variable  Base  Base Retired  Base RTI 
Base Retired 
RTI  IV Base  IV Retired 
Age17_19  -0.273  -0.259  0.112  0.124  0.316  0.305 
  (-1.32)  (-1.26)  (0.42)  (0.47)  (1.04)  (1.04) 
Age20_22  -0.424**  -0.413**  -0.028  -0.019  0.230  0.212 
  (-2.14)  (-2.09)  (-0.11)  (-0.08)  (0.78)  (0.74) 
Age23_25  -0.414**  -0.402**  -0.064  -0.055  0.176  0.160 
  (-2.19)  (-2.13)  (-0.26)  (-0.23)  (0.63)  (0.59) 
Age26_28  -0.409**  -0.395**  -0.050  -0.038  0.184  0.171 
  (-2.28)  (-2.20)  (-0.22)  (-0.17)  (0.69)  (0.66) 
Age29_31  -0.364**  -0.346**  -0.032  -0.017  0.216  0.203 
  (-2.13)  (-2.03)  (-0.14)  (-0.08)  (0.84)  (0.81) 
Age32_34  -0.352**  -0.331**  -0.033  -0.015  0.152  0.150 
  (-2.18)  (-2.05)  (-0.16)  (-0.07)  (0.64)  (0.66) 
Age35_37  -0.299  -0.274  -0.016  0.005  0.071  0.082 
  (-1.96)  (-1.80)  (-0.08)  (0.03)  (0.33)  (0.39) 
Age38_40  -0.257  -0.229  0.013  0.037  0.015  0.040 
  (-1.79)  (-1.59)  (0.07)  (0.20)  (0.07)  (0.20) 
Age41_43  -0.213  -0.181  0.017  0.044  -0.046  -0.012 
  (-1.58)  (-1.34)  (0.10)  (0.25)  (-0.23)  (-0.06) 
Age44_46  -0.174  -0.139  0.037  0.067  -0.052  -0.013 
  (-1.38)  (-1.11)  (0.23)  (0.42)  (-0.27)  (-0.07) 
Age47_49  -0.143  -0.105  0.033  0.065  -0.053  -0.011 
  (-1.23)  (-0.90)  (0.22)  (0.43)  (-0.29)  (-0.06) 
Age50_52  -0.117  -0.076  0.035  0.070  -0.072  -0.026 
  (-1.08)  (-0.70)  (0.25)  (0.50)  (-0.42)  (-0.15) 
Age53_55  -0.086  -0.044  0.027  0.064  -0.098  -0.051 
  (-0.87)  (-0.44)  (0.21)  (0.50)  (-0.61)  (-0.31) 
Age56_58  0.042  0.082  0.114  0.149  -0.058  -0.006 
  (0.46)  (0.90)  (0.97)  (1.27)  (-0.35)  (-0.04) 
Age59_61  0.197**  0.225**  0.268**  0.291***  0.030  0.082 
  (2.40)  (2.73)  (2.52)  (2.73)  (0.17)  (0.46) 
Age62_64  0.312***  0.313***  0.354***  0.353***  0.024  0.069 
  (4.22)  (4.24)  (3.71)  (3.70)  (0.12)  (0.35) 
Age65_67  0.391***  0.375***  0.421***  0.405***  0.031  0.073 
  (5.93)  (5.68)  (4.95)  (4.75)  (0.14)  (0.34) 
Age68_70  0.349***  0.331***  0.363***  0.346***  -0.029  0.013 
  (5.96)  (5.64)  (4.81)  (4.58)  (-0.14)  (0.06) 
Age71_73  0.323***  0.309***  0.313***  0.300***  -0.051  -0.011 
  (6.29)  (6.00)  (4.76)  (4.55)  (-0.26)  (-0.06) 
Age74_76  0.250***  0.239***  0.248***  0.238***  -0.070  -0.034 
  (5.53)  (5.29)  (4.26)  (4.09)  (-0.42)  (-0.20) 
Age77_79  0.154***  0.148***  0.169***  0.163***  -0.019  0.003 
  (4.01)  (3.83)  (3.38)  (3.26)  (-0.17)  (0.03) 
lgERHInc  0.262***  0.261***  0.272***  0.271***  0.172***  0.181*** 
  (25.05)  (24.95)  (19.56)  (19.48)  (4.25)  (4.42) 
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Table 1. The effect of relational goods on Life Satisfaction: GSOEP, 1984 – 2007 (fixed effects regression) (follows) 
Variable  Base  Base Retired  Base RTI 
Base Retired 
RTI  IV Base  IV Retired 
Unemp  -0.532***  -0.510***  -0.541***  -0.521***  -0.566***  -0.550*** 
  (-22.81)  (-21.57)  (-18.32)  (-17.43)  (-19.30)  (-18.56) 
lossjob  -0.010  -0.015  0.011  0.007  0.023  0.021 
  (-0.35)  (-0.56)  (0.33)  (0.20)  (0.67)  (0.63) 
Emp  0.104***  0.124***  0.107***  0.126***  0.181***  0.185*** 
  (8.36)  (9.55)  (6.63)  (7.44)  (4.71)  (5.12) 
WestDT  0.225***  0.226***  0.169**  0.171**  0.081  0.087 
  (4.59)  (4.62)  (2.76)  (2.78)  (1.16)  (1.28) 
Married  0.150***  0.153***  0.188***  0.191***  0.455***  0.421*** 
  (6.43)  (6.54)  (6.12)  (6.20)  (3.43)  (3.12) 
getMar  0.224***  0.222***  0.195***  0.194***  0.185***  0.185*** 
  (8.85)  (8.77)  (5.84)  (5.80)  (4.90)  (5.09) 
Separated  -0.166***  -0.163***  -0.136**  -0.133**  0.140  0.106 
  (-3.38)  (-3.32)  (-2.11)  (-2.07)  (0.96)  (0.72) 
getSep  -0.293***  -0.294***  -0.239***  -0.240***  -0.263***  -0.261*** 
  (-4.90)  (-4.91)  (-3.03)  (-3.05)  (-3.58)  (-3.68) 
Divorced  0.068  0.069  0.104**  0.105**  0.370***  0.336** 
  (1.91)  (1.95)  (2.21)  (2.24)  (2.68)  (2.39) 
getDiv  -0.098**  -0.098**  -0.106  -0.106  -0.119  -0.117** 
  (-2.11)  (-2.12)  (-1.73)  (-1.74)  (-1.95)  (-1.98) 
Widowed  -0.339***  -0.355***  -0.313***  -0.327***  -0.273***  -0.289*** 
  (-7.58)  (-7.91)  (-5.38)  (-5.61)  (-4.39)  (-4.69) 
NKid  0.096***  0.096***  0.093***  0.094***  0.097***  0.096*** 
  (12.40)  (12.46)  (9.24)  (9.28)  (8.24)  (8.42) 
nEdYear  0.010**  0.009  0.012**  0.012**  0.031***  0.028*** 
  (2.12)  (1.89)  (2.10)  (1.94)  (3.01)  (2.70) 
Owner  0.115***  0.115  0.127***  0.128***  0.103***  0.105*** 
  (8.61)  (8.66)  (7.37)  (7.40)  (5.00)  (5.25) 
HospStay  -0.186***  -0.185***  -0.184***  -0.183***  -0.114***  -0.122*** 
  (-17.86)  (-17.78)  (-13.56)  (-13.51)  (-3.19)  (-3.38) 
OccupDis  -0.300***  -0.310***  -0.275***  -0.285***  -0.201***  -0.217*** 
  (-15.48)  (-15.98)  (-10.92)  (-11.30)  (-5.00)  (-5.17) 
Time dummies  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Dummy for 1992  0.579***  0.601***  0.486***  0.506***  0.557***  0.577*** 
  (11.19)  (11.57)  (7.44)  (7.71)  (7.32)  (7.66) 
Retired    0.120***    0.109***    0.076** 
    (5.53)    (3.91)    (2.13) 
RTI      0.209***  0.208***  2.649**  2.336** 
      (17.84)  (17.8)  (2.31)  (1.99) 
Constant  4.808***  4.755***  4.341***  4.295***  1.997  2.279 
   (37.66)  (37.14)  (26.28)  (25.9)  (1.71)  (1.92) 
Observations   241938  241933  155473  155468  152134  152129 





Note: t- statistics are in parenthesis, stars for significance levels : **<5%, ***<1%. Standard errors are robust. Omitted age category: 
>79. IV estimates RTI instrumented by the age-retirement pattern   28
Table 2. Robustness in subsample splits  
  Men  Women  West  East 
Not 
Unemp  Unemp 
Not 
OccDis  OccDis 
Base Retired                 
Retired  0.217***  0.083***  0.122***  0.147***  0.107***  0.221  0.102***  0.248*** 
  (6.64)  (2.74)  (4.86)  (3.31)  (4.66)  (1.28)  (4.17)  (4.23) 
Observations  117054  124879  186497  55436  224982  16951  213715  28218 
                 
Base RTI                 
RTI  0.193***  0.226***  0.205***  0.202***  0.203***  0.088  0.175***  0.364*** 
  (11.74)  (13.56)  (15.40)  (8.03)  (16.96)  (1.09)  (14.26)  (8.58) 
Observations  75078  80395  116105  39368  143983  11490  137575  17898 
                 
Base Retired RTI                 
RTI  0.193***  0.226***  0.204***  0.201***  0.203***  0.087  0.175***  0.361*** 
  (11.71)  (13.54)  (15.38)  (7.96)  (16.93)  (1.08)  (14.23)  (8.51) 
Retired  0.210***  0.058  0.112***  0.137**  0.084***  0.350  0.100***  0.202*** 
  (5.02)  (1.50)  (3.42)  (2.51)  (2.83)  (1.56)  (3.12)  (2.65) 
Observations  75073  80395  116100  39368  143978  11490  137572  17896 
                 
IV Base                 
RTI  4.054**  1.171  2.192**  4.864  2.664**  -15.750  3.548  2.778** 
  (2.32)  (0.74)  (2.03)  (1.58)  (2.43)  (-0.28)  (1.76)  (2.54) 
Davidson-
MacKinnon test of 
exogeneity  10.307  no  4.421  no  0.007  no  no  0.011 
F – Test  (1,57461)    (1,90212)    (1,109084)      (1,12406) 
P – Value  0.001    0.036    7.329      6.505 
Observations  73499  78635  116037  36097  141120  11014  134495  17639 
                 
IV Retired                 
RTI  3.454**  1.001  1.857  5.255  2.475**  -16.982  3.295  2.721** 
  (2.10)  (0.57)  (1.74)  (1.37)  (2.18)  (-0.28)  (1.49)  (2.46) 
Retired  0.184***  0.039  0.095***  -0.135  0.050  0.509  0.039  0.110 
  (3.49)  (0.66)  (2.82)  (-0.58)  (1.34)  (0.68)  (0.66)  (1.19) 
Davidson-
MacKinnon test of 
exogeneity  7.060  no  no  no  5.576  no  no  6.019 
F – Test  (1,57455)        (1,109078)       (1,12403) 
P – Value  0.008        0.018      0.014 
Observations  73494  78635  116032  36097  141115  11014  134492  17637 
Notes: Sub samples are  Male vs Female, West vs East Germans, Registered as unemployed vs not registered, reporting 
occupational disability vs not reporting. t – statistics in parenthesis. Stars for significance levels : **<5%, ***<1%. 
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Table 3.a. Robustness check in alternative models: pooled regression with quadratic age specification (1) or age 
categories (2). Same controls as in the benchmark model with time dummies. 
 
All 
 sample  Men   Women  West   East  
Not 
Unemp  Unemp 
Not 
OccupDis  OccupDis
Pooled 1                            
Retired  0.064***  0.121***  0.048**  0.068***  0.133***  0.065***  0.222***  0.110***  -0.027 
  (4.53)  (5.34)  (2.52)  (4.22)  (4.47)  (4.50)  (3.61)  (7.18)  (-0.70) 
Observations  241933  117054  124879  186497  55436  224982  16951  213715  28218 
                   
Pooled 2                   
Retired  -0.087***  0.037  -0.105*** -0.061*** -0.084**  -0.098*** 0.198***  -0.025  -0.106***
  (-5.52)  (1.50)  (-4.84)  (-3.38)  (-2.48)  (-6.00)  (3.23)  (-1.40)  (-2.73) 
Observations  241933  117054  124879  186497  55436  224982  16951  213715  28218 
                   
Pooled 1                   
RTI  0.436***  0.415***  0.458***  0.429***  0.441***  0.427***  0.505***  0.393***  0.706*** 
  (52.98)  (35.69)  (39.18)  (46.20)  (24.68)  (51.02)  (13.09)  (46.16)  (25.30) 
Observations  155647  75166  80481  116232  39415  144140  11507  137722  17925 
                   
Pooled 2                   
RTI  0.420***  0.397***  0.446***  0.413***  0.429***  0.413***  0.498***  0.380***  0.682*** 
  (51.06)  (34.13)  (38.12)  (44.45)  (23.94)  (49.28)  (12.94)  (44.63)  (24.38) 
Observations  155647  75166  80481  116232  39415  144140  11507  137722  17925 
                   
Pooled 1                   
RTI  0.436***  0.415***  0.458***  0.429***  0.442***  0.428***  0.503***  0.393***  0.706*** 
  (53.00)  (35.72)  (39.22)  (46.19)  (24.73)  (51.04)  (13.05)  (46.13)  (25.26) 
Retired  0.064***  0.102***  0.069***  0.059***  0.133***  0.064***  0.188**  0.105***  -0.003 
  (3.72)  (3.67)  (2.93)  (2.96)  (3.76)  (3.63)  (2.50)  (5.58)  (-0.07) 
Observations  155642  75161  80481  116227  39415  144135  11507  137719  17923 
                   
Pooled 2                   
RTI  0.420***  0.397***  0.445***  0.413***  0.428***  0.413***  0.497***  0.380***  0.679*** 
  (50.97)  (34.14)  (38.02)  (44.42)  (23.88)  (49.18)  (12.91)  (44.62)  (24.23) 
Retired  -0.073***  0.021  -0.069**  -0.058**  -0.059  -0.083*** 0.170**  -0.021  -0.072 
  (-3.75)  (0.69)  (-2.59)  (-2.59)  (-1.48)  (-4.15)  (2.25)  (-0.95)  (-1.51) 
Observations  155642  75161  80481  116227  39415  144135  11507  137719  17923 
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Table 3.b. Robustness check in alternative models: fixed effect regression with quadratic age specification (1) or 
age categories (2). Same controls as in the benchmark model, no time dummies. 
 
All  
sample  Men   Women  West   East  
Not 
Unemp  Unemp 
Not 
OccupDis  OccupDis 
Fixed effect 1                              
Retired  0.222***  0.297***  0.191*** 0.205*** 0.306*** 0.224*** 0.217  0.200***  0.304*** 
  (11.41)  (9.96)  (7.04)  (9.22)  (7.55)  (10.88)  (1.27)  (9.23)  (5.30) 
Observations  241933  117054  124879  186497  55436  224982  16951  213715  28218 
                   
Fixed effect 2                   
Retired  0.097***  0.199***  0.058  0.097*** 0.135*** 0.084*** 0.210  0.078***  0.232*** 
  (4.51)  (6.12)  (1.91)  (3.87)  (3.05)  (3.69)  (1.23)  (3.19)  (3.96) 
Observations  241933  117054  124879  186497  55436  224982  16951  213715  28218 
                   
Fixed effect 1                   
RTI  0.184***  0.168***  0.200*** 0.180*** 0.172*** 0.180*** 0.056  0.154***  0.326*** 
  (16.96)  (10.94)  (12.99)  (14.70)  (7.27)  (16.20)  (0.77)  (13.50)  (8.18) 
Observations  155647  75166  80481  116232  39415  144140  11507  137722  17925 
                   
Fixed effect 2                   
RTI  0.177***  0.160***  0.193*** 0.175*** 0.159*** 0.173*** 0.052  0.148***  0.315*** 
  (16.29)  (10.45)  (12.55)  (14.24)  (6.69)  (15.62)  (0.71)  (12.97)  (7.91) 
Observations  155647  75166  80481  116232  39415  144140  11507  137722  17925 
                   
Fixed effect 1                    
RTI  0.183***  0.167***  0.198*** 0.179*** 0.167*** 0.178*** 0.056  0.153***  0.322*** 
  (16.81)  (10.86)  (12.88)  (14.62)  (7.05)  (16.07)  (0.77)  (13.38)  (8.08) 
Retired  0.210***  0.289***  0.164*** 0.189*** 0.299*** 0.203*** 0.334  0.198***  0.258*** 
  (8.32)  (7.56)  (4.67)  (6.43)  (5.98)  (7.61)  (1.50)  (6.94)  (3.49) 
Observations  155642  75161  80481  116227  39415  144135  11507  137719  17923 
                   
Fixed effect 2                    
RTI  0.177***  0.160***  0.193*** 0.175*** 0.157*** 0.173*** 0.052  0.148***  0.313*** 
  (16.28)  (10.44)  (12.54)  (14.23)  (6.64)  (15.61)  (0.71)  (12.96)  (7.86) 
Retired  0.093***  0.198***  0.039  0.092*** 0.134**  0.069**  0.324  0.082**  0.193** 
  (3.36)  (4.78)  (1.00)  (2.81)  (2.45)  (2.33)  (1.45)  (2.57)  (2.55) 
Observations  155642  75161  80481  116227  39415  144135  11507  137719  17923 
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Table 4. The effect of relational goods on Life Satisfaction: GSOEP, 1984 – 2007 (ordered probit regression with 
Mundlak correction) 








             
lgERHInc  0.240***  0.269***  0.260***  0.260***  0.241***  0.258*** 
   (32.39)  (28.35)  (27.45)  (27.44)  (34.80)  (18.84) 
Unemp  -0.347***  -0.345***  -0.350***  -0.347***  -0.344***  -0.230*** 
   (-22.66)  (-17.98)  (-18.48)  (-18.12)  (-21.91)  (-8.95) 
lossjob  -0.024  -0.013  -0.011  -0.011  -0.015  -0.010 
   (-1.34)  (-0.57)  (-0.48)  (-0.51)  (-0.85)  (-0.30) 
Emp  0.087***  0.089***  0.094***  0.096***  0.101***  0.085*** 
   (9.61)  (7.55)  (8.22)  (8.19)  (10.76)  (4.46) 
WestDT  0.168***  0.134***  0.134***  0.135***  0.140***  0.034 
   (4.86)  (3.18)  (3.19)  (3.19)  (3.91)  (0.32) 
Married  0.128***  0.133***  0.155***  0.155***  0.101***  0.215 
   (7.32)  (5.98)  (6.99)  (7.00)  (5.77)  (1.94) 
getMar  0.218***  0.194***  0.193***  0.193***  0.226***  0.091 
   (11.08)  (7.72)  (7.67)  (7.66)  (11.43)  (1.48) 
Separated  -0.137***  -0.161***  -0.141***  -0.140***  -0.170***  -0.158 
   (-4.10)  (-3.84)  (-3.35)  (-3.34)  (-5.05)  (-1.28) 
getSep  -0.182***  -0.121**  -0.121**  -0.121**  -0.177***  -0.108 
   (-4.80)  (-2.50)  (-2.49)  (-2.50)  (-4.64)  (-1.36) 
Divorced  0.054**  0.039  0.062  0.062  0.016  0.071 
   (2.17)  (1.22)  (1.95)  (1.95)  (0.63)  (0.61) 
getDiv  -0.067**  -0.051  -0.052  -0.052  -0.058  -0.042 
   (-2.17)  (-1.26)  (-1.29)  (-1.29)  (-1.87)  (-0.54) 
Widowed  -0.356***  -0.373***  -0.368***  -0.370***  -0.427***  -0.331*** 
   (-12.11)  (-9.93)  (-9.80)  (-9.83)  (-14.56)  (-2.90) 
NKid  0.098***  0.104***  0.105***  0.105***  0.108***  0.163*** 
   (17.91)  (14.98)  (15.07)  (15.08)  (20.06)  (10.80) 
nEdYear  0.010***  0.008  0.009**  0.009**  0.007  -0.002 
   (2.99)  (1.83)  (2.08)  (2.04)  (2.03)  (-0.18) 
Owner  0.087***  0.092***  0.091***  0.091***  0.073***  0.089*** 
   (8.66)  (7.30)  (7.26)  (7.26)  (7.19)  (3.41) 
HospStay  -0.135  -0.140***  -0.134***  -0.134***  -0.135***  -0.213*** 
   (-18.19)  (-14.72)  (-14.09)  (-14.09)  (-18.01)  (-16.35) 
OccupDis  -0.335***  -0.357***  -0.345***  -0.347***  -0.337***  -0.312*** 
   (-29.27)  (-25.47)  (-25.03)  (-24.88)  (-28.94)  (-19.18) 
Retired    0.013    0.015  0.027  0.080*** 
     (0.77)    (0.87)  (1.88)  (4.36) 
f(RA)          0.255***  0.181** 
           (3.22)  (2.15) 
RTI      0.229***  0.229***      
       (30.95)  (30.95)      
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Table 4. The effect of relational goods on Life Satisfaction: GSOEP, 1984 – 2007 (ordered probit regression with 
Mundlak correction) (follows) 








Time dummies  Yes   Yes   Yes   Yes   Yes   Yes  
Dummy for 1992  0.044  0.015  0.045  0.045  0.096  0.135 
   (2.75)  (0.92)  (2.75)  (2.74)  (7.27)  (5.44) 
Age Categories  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
 
Mundlak correction 
terms  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Constant             
Intercept term 1  -0.477  -0.516  -0.679  -0.664  0.032  0.196 
   (-5.28)  (-5.17)  (-7.03)  (-6.77)  (0.28)  (1.13) 
Intercept term 2  -0.155  -0.181  -0.343  -0.328  0.354  0.531 
   (-1.73)  (-1.83)  (-3.57)  (-3.36)  (3.07)  (3.07) 
Intercept term 3  0.319  0.298  0.140  0.154  0.828  1.007 
   (3.56)  (3.02)  (1.46)  (1.59)  (7.19)  (5.84) 
Intercept term 4  0.822  0.805  0.650  0.665  1.331  1.524 
   (9.18)  (8.18)  (6.82)  (6.86)  (11.57)  (8.84) 
Intercept term 5  1.228  1.210  1.056  1.071  1.736  1.962 
   (13.71)  (12.29)  (11.08)  (11.06)  (15.09)  (11.38) 
Intercept term 6  2.040  2.026  1.875  1.890  2.545  2.880 
   (22.77)  (20.57)  (19.67)  (19.50)  (22.11)  (16.70) 
Intercept term 7  2.565  2.553  2.403  2.418  3.071  3.447 
   (28.63)  (25.91)  (25.19)  (24.94)  (26.67)  (19.98) 
Intercept term 8  3.402  3.393  3.244  3.259  3.909  4.285 
   (37.94)  (34.39)  (33.96)  (33.57)  (33.93)  (24.81) 
Intercept term 9  4.692  4.688  4.540  4.554  5.200  5.650 
   (52.19)  (47.36)  (47.37)  (46.77)  (45.05)  (32.63) 
Intercept term 10  5.595  5.596  5.447  5.462  6.103  6.516 
   (62.108)  (56.37)  (56.66)  (55.91)  (52.80)  (37.55) 
               
Observations  241938  155468  155473  155468  238590  75998 
Log likelihood  - 407413.3  -265596  -265127.65  -265119.59  -401462.89   -126994.87 
Note: Z – statistics are in parenthesis, stars for significance levels : **<5%, ***<1%.  
Mundlak correction terms are the averages over time of the socio demographic variables. f(RA) is the age retirement 
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Table A1. Summary statistics and variable description 
Variable     Mean  Std. Dev.  Min  Max  Observations 
LifeSat 
individual response to the question about overall life satisfaction on a scale from 0 (completely 
dissatisfied) to 10 (completely satisfied) 
  overall  6.998687 1.843842 0 10  N =  359414
  between  1.497601 0 10  n =   45116
   within    1.298756 -2.155159 14.73782  T-bar = 7.96644  39
Age  age of respondent 
  overall  44.92886 17.27107 16 99  N =  360659
  between  18.11675 16.5 98.5  n =   45167
   within    4.501839 23.59553 73.72886  T-bar = 7.98501
lgERHInc 
logarithm of the real household post government income computed using the OECD equivalence scale 
which gives a value of 1 to the first household member, of 0.7 to each additional adult and of 0.5 to each 
child 
  overall  5.71935 0.7368481 -0.2812348 10.31859  N =  450670
  between  0.6779744 2.535179 9.872525  n =   56284
  within  0.3958774 0.5154164 8.936131  T-bar = 8.00707
Unemp  dummy for being registered as unemployed the previous year 
  overall  0.0663784 0.2489427 0 1  N =  353323
  between  0.1822691 0 1  n =   44888
  within  0.1955424 -0.8780661 1.024712  T-bar = 7.87121
lossjob  dummy for becoming unemployed during the previous year 
  overall  0.0316941 0.1751847 0 1  N =  301034
  between  0.1041184 0 1  n =   37869
  within  0.1599804 -0.6349726 0.9882158  T-bar = 7.94935
Emp 
dummy for employment status, which takes the value of 1 if the individual is full-time employed. The base 
category is composed by the remaining employment status options: regular part time employment, 
vocational training, marginal employed, near retirement or zero working hours, military service, 
community service, disabled employed, not employed. 
  overall  0.4346967 0.4957178 0 1  N =  360709
  between  0.4307905 0 1  n =   45180
  within  0.2879888 -0.5236367 1.39303  T-bar = 7.98382
WestDT  dummy for living in a Federal Land of the former West Germany 
  overall  0.7934599 0.404823 0 1  N =  521763
  between  0.3974125 0 1  n =   57832
  within  0.0676256 -0.1648735 1.737904  T-bar = 9.02205
Married  dummy for being married 
  overall  0.6253467 0.4840339 0 1  N =  360907
  between  0.4665301 0 1  n =   45167
  within    0.2137265 -0.3329866 1.58368  T-bar =  7.9905
getMar  dummy for becoming married 
  overall  0.0159117 0.125134 0 1  N =  310590
  between  0.0690619 0 1  n =   38498
  within    0.1171187 -0.4840883 0.9724334  T-bar = 8.06769
     
Table A1. Summary statistics and variable description (follows) 
Variable     Mean  Std. Dev.  Min  Max  Observations 
Separated  dummy for being separated 
  overall  0.0155303 0.1236494 0 1  N =  360907
  between  0.0948185 0 1  n =   45167
  within    0.0991693 -0.8935606 0.9738637  T-bar =  7.9905
getSep  dummy for becoming separated 
  overall  0.0067066 0.0816188 0 1  N =  310590  40
  between  0.0474313 0 1  n =   38498
  within    0.0757366 -0.4932934 0.9632283  T-bar = 8.06769
Divorced  dummy for being divorced 
  overall  0.0632601 0.2434305 0 1  N =  360907
  between  0.2137163 0 1  n =   45167
  within    0.1224026 -0.8950733 1.021593  T-bar =  7.9905
getDiv  dummy for becoming divorced 
  overall  0.0062365 0.0787251 0 1  N =  310590
  between  0.0472064 0 1  n =   38498
  within    0.0732374 -0.4937635 0.9627583  T-bar = 8.06769
Widowed  dummy for being widoved 
  overall  0.0634568 0.2437831 0 1  N =  360907
  between  0.2347744 0 1  n =   45167
  within    0.0958456 -0.8948765 1.02179  T-bar =  7.9905
NKid  the number of children in the household 
  overall  0.9414802 1.143354 0 10  N =  474284
  between  1.053981 0 8.285714  n =   57832
  within    0.578876 -6.915663 6.864557  T-bar = 8.20107
nEdYear  years devoted to education 
  overall  11.47531 2.581218 7 18  N =  348398
  between  2.566649 7 18  n =   43253
   within    0.7195988 2.040526 20.04674  T-bar = 8.05489
Owner  dummy for being tenant or owner of the dwelling 
  overall  0.4565155 0.498106 0 1  N =  477515
  between  0.4607174 0 1  n =   57832
  within    0.2329825 -0.5018178 1.414849  T-bar = 8.25693
HospStay  a dummy for overnight stay in hospital during the previous year 
  overall  0.1185592 0.3232696 0 1  N =  330046
  between  0.2066107 0 1  n =   44525
  within    0.283803 -0.8147741 1.073105  T-bar =  7.4126
OccupDis  dummy for being unable to work or severely handicapped 
  overall  0.1118429 0.3151736 0 1  N =  297158
  between  0.270461 0 1  n =   41574
  within    0.1618354 -0.8355256 1.059211  T-bar = 7.14769
   
     
     
Table A1. Summary statistics and variable description (follows) 
Variable     Mean  Std. Dev.  Min  Max  Observations 
RTI  Relational Time Index, values: 0 "Never" 1 "Less Frequent" 2 "Every Month" 3 "Every Week" 
  overall  1.001114 0.5912067 0 3  N =  228163
  between  0.5140423 0 3  n =   41578
  within  0.3546132 -1.158261 3.201114  T-bar = 5.48759
Age17_19  dummies for age group : 3 years 
  overall  0.0501915 0.2183401 0 1  N = 360659  41
  between  0.2470165 0 1  n = 45167
  within  0.1554439 -0.7498085 1.008525  T-bar = 7.98501
Age20_22  overall  0.0505796 0.219138 0 1  N = 360659
  between  0.1708795 0 1  n = 45167
  within  0.1813263 -0.7494204 1.008913  T-bar = 7.98501
Age23_25  overall  0.051514 0.2210441 0 1  N = 360659
  between  0.1598536 0 1  n = 45167
  within  0.1891186 -0.748486 1.009847  T-bar = 7.98501
Age26_28  overall  0.053308 0.2246472 0 1  N = 360659
  between  0.147811 0 1  n = 45167
  within  0.1960994 -0.696692 1.011641  T-bar = 7.98501
Age29_31  overall  0.055845 0.2296225 0 1  N = 360659
  between  0.1466251 0 1  n = 45167
  within  0.2026881 -0.694155 1.014178  T-bar = 7.98501
Age32_34  overall  0.058773 0.2351996 0 1  N = 360659
  between  0.1479322 0 1  n = 45167
  within  0.2086298 -0.691227 1.017106  T-bar = 7.98501
Age35_37  overall  0.0614098 0.2400808 0 1  N = 360659
  between  0.1507323 0 1  n = 45167
  within  0.2129521 -0.7385902 1.019743  T-bar = 7.98501
Age38_40  overall  0.0612739 0.2398325 0 1  N = 360659
  between  0.1500635 0 1  n = 45167
  within  0.2127596 -0.6887261 1.019607  T-bar = 7.98501
Age41_43  overall  0.0596852 0.236903 0 1  N = 360659
  between  0.1496233 0 1  n = 45167
  within  0.2097725 -0.7403148 1.018019  T-bar = 7.98501
Age44_46  overall  0.0575863 0.2329597 0 1  N = 360659
  between  0.1487377 0 1  n = 45167
  within  0.2061942 -0.6924137 1.01592  T-bar = 7.98501
Age47_49  overall  0.0547581 0.2275078 0 1  N = 360659
  between  0.1419028 0 1  n = 45167
  within  0.2012445 -0.6952419 1.013091  T-bar = 7.98501
Age50_52  overall  0.0516333 0.2212858 0 1  N = 360659
  between  0.1412822 0 1  n = 45167
  within  0.1952639 -0.6983667 1.009967  7.98501
Age53_55  overall  0.0479844 0.2137335 0 1  N = 360659
  between  0.1353563 0 1  n = 45167
  within  0.1886515 -0.7020156 1.006318  T-bar = 7.98501
Table A1. Summary statistics and variable description (follows) 
Variable     Mean  Std. Dev.  Min  Max  Observations 
Age56_58  overall  0.0454252 0.2082351 0 1  N = 360659
  between  0.1293696 0 1  n = 45167
  within  0.1843189 -0.7045748 1.003759  T-bar = 7.98501
     
Age59_61  overall  0.0436063 0.2042178 0 1  N = 360659
  between  0.1331331 0 1  n = 45167  42
  within  0.179259 -0.7063937 1.00194  T-bar = 7.98501
     
Age62_64  overall  0.0417846 0.2000969 0 1  N = 360659
  between  0.1274496 0 1  n = 45167
  within  0.1751416 -0.7082154 1.000118  T-bar = 7.98501
     
Age65_67  overall  0.0372429 0.1893568 0 1  N = 360659
  between  0.1217941 0 1  n = 45167
  within  0.164972 -0.7127571 0.9955763  T-bar = 7.98501
     
Age68_70  overall  0.0301809 0.1710849 0 1  N = 360659
  between  0.1119404 0 1  n = 45167
  within  0.14869 -0.7198191 0.9885142  T-bar = 7.98501
     
Age71_73  overall  0.024849 0.1556649 0 1  N = 360659
  between  0.1059698 0 1  n = 45167
  within  0.1339598 -0.725151 0.9831823  T-bar = 7.98501
     
Age74_76  overall  0.0202463 0.1408418 0 1  N = 360659
  between  0.0994959 0 1  n = 45167
  within  0.1201694 -0.7297537 0.9785796  T-bar = 7.98501
     
Age77_79  overall  0.0159264 0.125191 0 1  N = 360659
  between  0.0932999 0 1  n = 45167
  within  0.1056717 -0.7340736 0.9742597  T-bar = 7.98501
Note: N is the total number of observations; n is the total number of individuals; T is the number of waves. 
   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 